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SELF INCRIMINATION AND THE INSANITY PLEA:
OUT OF THE MOUTHS OF BABES
SUZANNE R. ARMSTRONG*
In the first degree murder case of State v. Isley,I defendant Billy Isley
asserted the affirmative defense of insanity in addition to his plea of not
guilty.2 The psychiatrist, who was appointed to determine Isley's sanity
at the time of the offense as well as Isley's competency to stand trial,
testified at trial as to statements made by the defendant during his psy-
chiatric examination. The court gave no instruction that the statements
be considered solely on the issue of insanity.3 As a result, the psychia-
trist's testimony, purportedly introduced to rebut Isley's insanity de-
fense, served to strengthen the state's case against Isley.
4
Despite the United States Supreme Court decision of Estelle v.
Smith, 5 holding that the use of a defendant's statements to a court-ap-
pointed psychiatrist violates the constitutional protection against self-
incrimination, and extensive legislative revision in the federal system, 6
the scope of the fifth amendment's protection remains uncertain when a
defendant attempts to introduce psychiatric evidence after asserting an
insanity or diminished capacity defense and submitting to a compelled
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A. 1967, Uni-
versity of Wyoming; M.A. 1971, University of South Carolina; J.D. 1980 (cum laude) Wal-
ter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Law clerk to the Honorable Peter T. Fay,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1980-81.
1. State v. Isley, No. 75-737 B (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1975). The author was ap-
pointed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to represent Isley in his appeal from the
denial of a petition for habeas corpus. The case was remanded to the district court because
Isley's counsel in the original habeas corpus proceeding had filed an Anders brief, and was
not, therefore, acting as an advocate for his client in that forum. Isley v. Wainwright, 792
F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986). See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2. Often a defendant will admit guilt and assert the defense of insanity to avoid being
found guilty. In cases such as Isley's where the defendant pleads not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity, he runs a great risk that evidence used for the insanity plea will
prejudice his not guilty plea. Nevertheless, such inconsistent pleading is allowed. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This article is concerned with
those cases where the the defendant faces the risk that insanity evidence will be used for
purposes other than to determine the defendant's mental state.
3. In Florida, the defendant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity
by going forward with evidence of insanity. The state must then prove sanity, as any other
element, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
4. The Isley case is strikingly similar to the hypothetical case posed by White, The
Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment in Capital Cases, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
943, 950-51 (1983), in which the defendant attempts to invoke the fifth amendment to
refuse to answer questions posed by the government's psychiatrist and the court rules that
he may not invoke the privilege if he wishes to call his own experts at trial. White uses this
hypothetical to illustrate his extensive discussion of the waiver doctrine in the insanity
cases.
5. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
6. See infra notes 133-59 and accompanying text.
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examination. Will admissions or inculpatory statements made during
the examination be protected by the fifth amendment? Must a defend-
ant give up his right against self-incrimination to assist in his defense?
Part One of this article briefly introduces the use of psychiatric testi-
mony in multiple contexts and discusses how these uses can prejudice a
defendant who pleads both not guilty and not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Part Two illustrates the inherent problems with the fifth amend-
ment in the kinds of cases introduced in Part One and discusses the
courts use of the waiver theory to justify admission of prejudicial evi-
dence in insanity cases. Part Three focuses on statutory revisions deal-
ing with the insanity defense in the federal system and recommends
legislative and judicial solutions. This article then concludes that the
use and admission of psychiatrists' testimony based upon compelled in-
terviews is violative of the fifth amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination.
I. PART ONE: USES OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY
IN MULTIPLE CONTEXTS
Government attempts to utilize psychiatric testimony for multiple
purposes, as in the Isley case, are not unusual. In Estelle v. Smith, 7 psychi-
atric testimony was introduced on the issue of future dangerousness in a
capital sentencing proceeding. The Court indicated it is the use of the
testimony in the proceeding and the danger of incrimination it invites
that forms the foundation for the implication of the fifth amendment
privilege.8 The privilege, therefore, applies to any "disclosures which
... could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other
evidence which might be so used." 9 The privilege applies where a state-
irent is or may be inculpatory, no matter what type of proceeding is
involved. 10
Government utilization of psychiatric testimony has occurred in five
separate settings. First and primarily, there are numerous instances
where the defendant has, in the process of a psychiatric examination,
made direct admissions of guilt. In subsequently testifying, the psychia-
trist related these statements as factual statements told to him by the
defendant. In instances such as Isley's where the actual facts of the
crime are disputed, such testimony may reasonably form the basis for a
determination of guilt.' As a result, courts have recognized that the
psychiatric testimony of direct admissions implicates the fifth
amendment. 12
7. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
8. Id. at 462 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967)).
9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 94 (1964)).
10. Id. at 49.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 843 (1982) (statements made in competency examination admissible on issue of san-
ity at the time of the offense as basis of doctor's opinion).
12. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906, 2918 (1987); United States v.
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Second, such admissions may be used by the state in proving the
requisite mens rea in any case requiring proof of specific intent or some
other mental state. In fact, evidence sufficient to prove mental capacity
may not be available to the state except through the sanity examination.
Thus, the defendant's election to plead insanity provides the govern-
ment with evidence allowing it to meet its burden.'
3
Third, a defendant can be incriminated by the expert's opinion even
though the defendant's statements and admissions are not specifically
discussed by the expert. Thus, when the expert opines that the defend-
ant is sane, the opinion may suggest the defendant is guilty because he is
sane. 1 4 Fourth, a psychiatrist's testimony may be used for impeachment
purposes. A testifying defendant may be impeached with information
that is directly attributable to statements the defendant made in a confi-
dential psychiatric interview. In these cases, the waiver of the privilege
is broad and the defendant obviously elects to submit himself to meth-
ods to ascertain the truthfulness of his testimony. When the defendant
elects to testify, this waiver may be said to be a knowing waiver; how-
ever, in cases where the defendant does not testify, evidence derived
from the confidential examination may also be used for impeaching the
credibility of the defendant's own experts in the guise of the govern-
ment's need to test the basis of their opinions. Thus, a waiver of the
privilege may occur even though the defendant does not testify.
Finally, a general category exists represented by cases where the
psychiatrist's testimony had an impact at trial even though not in one of
the above mentioned ways. For example, in White v. Estelle,15 the court
held the fifth amendment was violated by use of the psychiatrist's testi-
mony to establish future dangerousness based on a hypothetical ques-
tion which used facts gleaned from the psychiatric interview.
16
II. PART Two: FOUNDATIONS OF THE WAIVER THEORY-ILLUSTRATION
OF WAIVER IN MULTIPLE USE CASES
In an attempt to accommodate the need of the judicial system for
evidence which is probative of the issues of insanity and mens rea, and the
right of the defendant not to incriminate himself, courts have implied a
"waiver" of the fifth amendment privilege in insanity cases. One of the
difficulties in giving context to the "waiver" of the fifth amendment in
these cases is that the term waiver is often used inaccurately in insanity
Henderson, 770 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1985); Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78 (4th
Cir. 1978).
13. See Berry, Self Incrimination and the Compulsory Mental Examination: A Proposal, 15
ARIZ. L. REV. 919, 936-37 (1973).
14. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 now prohibits the expert from giving his opinion on
the ultimate issue of sanity. See United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D.D.C.
1987) (no testimony directly or indirectly opining on the issue of specific intent allowed).
15. 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983).
16. Isley's case is of this type in that the testimony of the psychiatrist was used to lend
credence to the testimony of the state's primary witness, herself a participant in the crime.
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cases. The "waiver" is in part an abrogation of the right against self-
incrimination and in part a balance of state and individual interests.
When a defendant pleads an insanity defense or otherwise puts his
mental condition in issue, he can be viewed as electing to burden his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination in order to exercise a
due process right; the right to present competent evidence in his de-
fense.' 7 This appears in the insanity cases to be permissible despite the
fact that in Simmons v. United States, 18 the Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant could not be forced to choose between a valid fourth amend-
ment claim and a waiver of his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The defendant in Simmons testified in a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing that established ownership of a container which had been
illegally seized. The defendant's ownership was a critical element at trial
on the issue of guilt. The Court said, "[i]n these circumstances, we find
it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another."' 19 Recognizing that the defendant was
"compelled" to testify at the pretrial hearing only if he wished to benefit
from the exclusionary rule, the Court found this forced election intoler-
able when the so called "benefit" sought was a constitutionally guaran-
teed right.
20
Despite the Simmons case, the government has generally been suc-
cessful in requiring a defendant to waive the fifth amendment privilege
in such instances. For example, a defendant may be forced to accept
immunity and speak when he would otherwise have a right to remain
silent. 2 1 As commentators have noted,22 in immunity cases the govern-
ment extends the positive benefit of immunity, thereby eliminating any
harm to the defendant. The insanity defense, however, presents a more
difficult conundrum. If the defendant's right to offer competent evi-
dence in his defense is recognized as a fundamental, even constitutional
right, the resulting waiver of the fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination when insanity is asserted as a defense forces the defendant
to choose between the rights without receiving a "benefit." He is in the
same "intolerable" situation the Court saw in Simmons.
17. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), holds that the defendant has a
fundamental right to present exculpatory evidence in accord with traditional standards of
due process. Recently, in Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988), the Supreme Court
affirmed that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees the defendant
the right to put before the jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.
108 S. Ct. at 652. See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). There is no consti-
tutional "right" to present an insanity defense, but the right to present psychiatric evi-
dence, reaffirmed in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), illustrates the importance of
psychiatric based defenses.
18. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
19. Id. at 394.
20. See also Mobley ex rel Ross v. Meek, 531 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1976) (confession at
plea bargain could not be admitted as violation of fifth amendment; such a statement held
not "voluntary").
21. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972).
22. Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation, 31
EMORY L.J. 71, 91 (1982).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith 23 recognizes the
compulsory nature of the competency examination and the fifth amend-
ment ramifications when evidence gained from the examination is used
for purposes other than a competency determination. 24 In Smith, the
defendant was given a pretrial competency examination. He was con-
victed of first degree murder in a bifurcated proceeding 25 in which the
issue of future dangerousness was litigated at the capital sentencing
hearing. The state introduced the testimony of the psychiatrist who ex-
amined the defendant. The Court held that since Smith was examined
by the court-appointed psychiatrist solely for the purpose of determin-
ing competency to stand trial, the psychiatrist's testimony on the issue of
dangerousness must be excluded on fifth amendment grounds. As a re-
sult, a defendant may not constitutionally be compelled to respond to a
psychiatrist's questions if his answers can be used against him in a capi-
tal sentencing proceeding. 26 Smith neither voluntarily agreed to the ex-
amination nor sought to introduce psychiatric evidence. He received no
warning that his statements would or could be used by the state.
2 7
Smith clearly protects the fifth amendment privilege of the defend-
ant who is examined solely for the purpose of determining competency
and who does not plead the insanity defense. However, it leaves un-
resolved the fifth amendment waiver issue in circumstances where
mental status is an issue upon which the defendant must produce evi-
dence at trial. In these cases, the need for the government to rebut evi-
dence adduced in support of an insanity defense, or otherwise counter
evidence of mental condition, has caused some courts to find an implied
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. The circumstances of the
waiver, however, are only slightly more voluntary than in Simmons and
Smith.
Two cases relied on by the Court in Smith 2 8 illustrate the underpin-
nings of the waiver theory. Although factually these cases varied signifi-
cantly, in each case the defendant asserted a plea of insanity as a
defense.
In United States v. Bohle,2 9 the government's request for a pretrial
psychiatric examination was refused. 30 On the second day of trial, after
the defendant had raised the issue of insanity, the court ordered an ex-
amination. The defendant's requests to have his own psychiatrist and
23. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
24. Id. at 465. The Court said that if the examination and testimony therefrom is
confined to the issue of competency, there is no fifth amendment problem.
25. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
26. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981).
27. Id.
28. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bohle, 445
F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
29. 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
30. The opinion is not clear as to whether the purpose of the examination was to
determine competency or sanity. The possibility of an insanity defense was raised at a
bond hearing, but the plea was not asserted until trial. Id. at 58, 66.
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counsel present were denied.3 ' The basis of the Seventh Circuit's justi-
fication for ordering the examination was "the great importance of ex-
pert testimony on the issue of insanity and . . . the minimal risk to the
Fifth Amendment privilege."13 2 The court concluded that since the ex-
amination had as its sole inquiry the expert's opinion of the defendant's
mental capacity to form intent, the fifth amendment was not violated.3 3
The evidence would not be introduced to aid in the establishment of
facts showing the defendant committed the acts constituting the crime.
The Seventh Circuit ruled that as the trial court had cautioned counsel,
and presumably the jury, that any testimony predicated upon the psychi-
atrist's testimony would go to the issue of insanity only, the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege was fully protected. Thus, the court reasoned
that the privilege narrowly reaches only statements introduced to show
the defendant actually committed the offense, but not statements
brought in on the issue of sanity.3 4 The decision ignores the practicality
that facts brought out in the compelled competency examination will
establish intent as an element of the government's case, in addition to
the principle that the privilege protects statements which may be incrim-
inating, whatever their use.
3 5
In United States v. Cohen, 36 also relied on by the Supreme Court in
Smith, the defendant argued that since insanity negates intent-an ele-
ment of the crime-the trial court violated his fifth amendment privilege
when it forced him to submit to an examination by the government's
psychiatrist after he had interposed the insanity defense.3 7 The Fifth
Circuit held that the examination was proper, but based its decision on
the government's need for a satisfactory method of disproving the de-
fendant's insanity evidence. According to the Fifth Circuit, it is nearly
impossible to prove sanity without a statement from the defendant.3 8
The court held it would permit compelled examinations and use of evi-
dence therefrom when the defendant has raised the insanity issue
"[s]ince any statement about the offense itself could be suppressed."13 9
The decision purports to protect some statements of the defendant but
holds the defendant's individual right subject to the government's need.
In contrast, United States v. 4lvarez,40 a decision not relied on by the
Court in Smith, illustrates the inconsistency of the "waiver" cases. In
Alvarez, the defendant was successful in his argument that sanity is an
issue probative of guilt or innocence which the government must prove
31. On appeal, the issue of the exclusion of defendant's psychiatrist was deemed
waived for failure to assert it as error. Id. at 66.
32. Id.
33. ld; see also United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968) (examination
determined not guilt but capacity to be guilty).
34. 445 F.2d at 66-67.
35. See infra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
36. 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
37. 530 F.2d at 47.
38. Id. at 48 n.14.
39. 530 F.2d at 47; see also United States v. Bohle, I 455 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1969).
40. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
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without the defendant's assistance. In that case, a competency examina-
tion was ordered and the defendant was found competent. Insanity was
raised at trial, and the government's psychiatrist was allowed to testify,
over objection, that while the defendant denied involvement in the
crime, the defendant knew his acts were wrong.4 1 The Third Circuit
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated when any
statement elicited in a compelled examination tends to establish the fact
of the offense.
4 2
Thus, in Bohle and Cohen, fairness to the government or state re-
quired waiver of the fifth amendment privilege when the defendant in-
troduced the issue of insanity. In Smith and Alvarez, fairness to the
defendant required that the defendant not be surprised by the use of his
statements made in a competency examination when insanity was not
anticipated to be an issue at trial.
The fairness to the government idea has, however, long been used
by federal courts to allow evidence taken from psychiatric examinations
to be introduced when insanity is pled. This is true even in instances
like Alvarez where the examination was clearly one to determine compe-
tency. In Alvarez, the court refused to accept the government's argu-
ment that the competency examination ought to be considered as having
a dual purpose; the determination of competency and the determination
of sanity. The government sought to rely on a segment of cases in which
a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege has been implied when the
original examination was for competency to stand trial under former 18
U.S.C. section 424443 but the psychiatrist was allowed to testify as to
issues other than competency at trial, particularly on the issue of sanity.
The power to order competency examinations originates in the idea
that we recognize the need in our judicial system for the defendant to
understand the proceedings against him and to assist in the preparation
of his defense.4 4 In Pate v. Robinson,4 5 the United States Supreme Court
held the state has a constitutional duty to determine the mental condi-
tion of a defendant whose competency to stand trial is questioned and
such a defendant cannot "knowingly waive" this defense. In the federal
system, the statute authorizing the competency examination offers pro-
tection to the defendant by way of excluding the evidence gained from a
41. Id. at 1041.
42. Id. at 1042. While Alvarez appears to offer very broad protection to the defend-
ant's constitutional right against self-incrimination, it can be argued that it is not based on
constitutional grounds. The court found that the examination ordered was clearly one to
determine competency, and it reserved judgment on the issue whether the fifth amend-
ment would protect use, solely on the insanity issue, of evidence gleaned from an examina-
tion to determine sanity.
43. 62 Stat. 855. This section was revised as part of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II § 403(a), 98 Stat. 2057. The new provision,
located at 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (Supp. IV 1986), is substantially similar to the old competency
section, but the new statute adds section 4242, which authorizes the courts to order sanity
examinations.
44. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Featherston v. Mitchell, 418 F.2d
582, 586 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 937 (1970).
45. 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966).
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competency examination from admission on the issue of guilt. 46 The
defendant is compelled to respond to the order requiring examina-
tion,4 7 but the isolation of the competency issue from the issues of guilt,
intent, and justification-theoretically at least-assures that the defend-
ant suffers no prejudice by submitting to an examination for the sole
purpose of determining competency.
4 8
In the dual purpose cases, however, the courts have used a widely
recognized "inherent power" to order sanity examinations. The as-
sumption underlying the power is that expert testimony is critical to the
insanity issue; the courts, therefore, must be able to compel the defend-
ant to cooperate with an examiner where insanity is an issue or the gov-
ernment would be deprived of the necessary expert testimony. 49 It is
thus not an inherent power in the true constitutional sense but rather an
extension of due process or fairness concerns to the government.
The result of the use of the "inherent power" has been to authorize
dual purpose examinations if, "under the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case, the order does not impermissibly infringe the de-
fendant's constitutional guarantees." 50 For example, in United States v.
Wade, 51 the Ninth Circuit held that an order appointing a psychiatrist to
conduct a dual purpose examination was not authorized under 18
U.S.C. section 4244. Instead, the court held the trial court possessed
inherent power to order the examination. In United States v. Malcolm,
5 2
the same court held that concepts of estoppel, waiver, and fundamental
fairness allow the court to overcome the fifth amendment privilege when
the government asks for an examination after the defendant raised the
insanity defense. 53 In United States v. Jacquillon,54 the Fifth Circuit held
that in certain circumstances a psychiatrist who has examined a defend-
ant to determine competency might be competent to testify as to
insanity.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
47. Presumably, the defendant could be held in contempt for failure to cooperate
when a competency examination is ordered. Additionally, the uncooperative defendant
runs the risk of displaying "lack of remorse" by his silence before the doctor. Cf Gholson
v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982). This differs from the sanction of excluding the
defense of insanity or excluding defendant's psychiatric expert when defendant refuses to
cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist conducting a sanity examination, a sanction
which appears in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 (d). In Taylor v. Williams, 108
S. Ct. 646, 653 (1988), the Court upheld a similar sanction prohibiting testimony of a
defense witness when the defendant failed to comply with a discovery order. Though the
defendant has a right to present evidence, he must do so within established rules of proce-
dure. 108 S. Ct. at 653, n.15 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
48. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465 (1981). The courts have not given full
explanations of the determination that the privilege is not implicated when competency is
the sole issue. See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV. 648, 649-
50 (1970).
49. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 66 (7th Cir. 1971).
50. United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. 489 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1973).
52. 475 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 425.
54. 469 F.2d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).
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In both Malcolm and Jacquillon, procedural defaults prevented the
defendants from prevailing on the fifth amendment privilege. Though
the defendant in Malcolm had not invoked the insanity defense at the
time the dual purpose examination was conducted and was not informed
that the order appointing the psychiatrist authorized such a dual pur-
pose examination, he failed to object to the examination at the time he
pled insanity. Jacquillon, who was surprised at trial by the introduction
of the psychiatric testimony, was unable to show that he was prejudiced
by the dual purpose examination.
Though the dual purpose cases allow the court flexibility in order-
ing examinations and prevent duplication of effort, it is difficult to see
how a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege can be found when the
defendant has not yet pleaded insanity at the time of the examination.
When the defendant is examined under a statute purporting to author-
ize only the pretrial issue of competency, it can hardly be said he has
knowingly waived his right to fifth amendment protection on any issue at
trial. The dual purpose cases, then, present an even less appealing cir-
cumstance for implying a waiver than the cases where the incriminating
testimony comes from an examination which is actually a sanity evalua-
tion. In neither case, however, does the defendant make a full and
knowing waiver.
It is possible that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the ineptitude of the waiver analogy. For example, in Buchanan v. Ken-
tucky, 5 5 the waiver terminology does not appear. Buchanan asserted the
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance;" in asserting this defense,
he bore the burden of proof at trial. 56 Buchanan introduced the mental
status issue by calling a social worker to present evidence of his psycho-
logical status. He requested that the social worker read from several re-
ports and letters from his medical records prepared five years before the
occurrence of the crime for which he was charged. At the time of the
creation of the records, he was a juvenile in custody charged with the
crime of burglary. 5 7 At trial, the prosecution sought to have defendant's
witness read from a report of a psychological examination made at the
joint request of defense and prosecution at the time the defendant was
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court on the current charge of
murder.5 8 The evaluation was authorized by a statute59 governing in-
voluntary hospitalization and treatment. Defendant objected on the
ground that the hospitalization examination was irrelevant. 60  The
Supreme Court held that the report of the recent examination could be
55. 107 S.Ct. 2906 (1987).
56. Id. at 2910 n.8.
57. Id. at 2910 n.9.
58. Id. at 2911, n.10.
59. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 202A.010-990 (1977).
60. The Court noted that there appeared to be some confusion regarding this exami-
nation in the state courts. The examination, according to the Supreme Court, was for
hospitalization although the Kentucky Supreme Court referred to it as a competency ex-
amination. The report did contain the psychiatrist's opinion on the issue of competency,
although this portion of the report was not read to the jury. 107 S. Ct. at 2911 n. 1.
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admitted, distinguishing Buchanan from Smith in three respects. First,
the defendant in Buchanan had requested the examination. Second, the
defendant in Buchanan had asserted a mental status defense. 6 1 Third,
the examination report had not included any statements by Buchanan
dealing with the crime charged. 6 2 The introduction of the report for the
"limited" purpose of rebutting the mental status defense did not, ac-
cording to the Court, violate the fifth amendment.
6 3
The reasoning of the Buchanan decision appears to be that the fifth
amendment privilege in insanity cases is narrowly confined to instances
where the government goes beyond what is necessary to rebut the de-
fense and attempts to use statements by the defendant dealing with
crimes for which he is charged. If this can be taken as a sign that the
Court has determined that waiver is not the correct analogy, the deci-
sion is valuable for academic reasons because it appears to recognize
that waiver of a constitutional right should be extremely limited when no
substitute benefit is offered. The decision leaves a void, however, for
the practitioner who must advise his client how much of his privilege will
be given up if he asserts a mental status defense.
In Pope v. United States,6 4 the court suggested that the defendant
"waived" the fifth amendment protection by voluntarily making psycho-
logical evaluation an issue in the case.6 5 More than a decade later, the
waiver idea in insanity cases had grown to such an extent that the Fifth
Circuit in Battie v. Estelle6 6 said its earlier decision in United States v. Co-
hen 67 stood for the proposition that the introduction of psychiatric testi-
mony by the defendant constituted a waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege in the same manner as would the defendant's election to testify
at trial, despite the fact that Cohen specifically said that statements of the
defendant should be suppressed. 68 Despite the pervasive use of the
term "waiver," courts have given little substance to its scope or circum-
stances. Assuming it is a waiver, it is not a voluntary relinquishment of
the privilege against self-incrimination for two reasons: first, the deci-
sions have not made clear precisely how much or exactly under what
circumstances a relinquishment of the right will occur; second, it is ques-
tionable whether an incompetent or insane defendant would be fully
aware of the consequences of injecting the mental status issue. Because
the relinquishment of the right appears to rest more on the need for a
fair inquiry into the defendant's culpability 69 than on the defendant's
61. Id. at 2918.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds. 392
U.S. 651 (1968).
65. 372 F.2d at 720.
66. 655 F.2d 692, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
68. See text accompanying note 41.
69. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (plurality
opinion).
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"free and unconstrained" election, 70 perhaps it should not be called a
waiver at all.
Before suggesting how the courts and the legislatures might accom-
modate both the need for probative evidence and the protection of the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, it is helpful to see how
the scope of the privilege has been varied in the cases following Smith. It
appears that with respect to some uses of psychiatric testimony, the privi-
lege remains. Accordingly, the cases fall into categories as follows.
A. Admissions
The cases in which the fifth amendment privilege and the use of
testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist most clearly conflict are
those in which the defendant makes actual admissions of guilt to the
psychiatrist and the psychiatrist then testifies as to the admissions. 7 1 In
a clear majority of cases, courts have held that admissions made to
court-appointed psychiatrists are inadmissible on the issue of guilt.
7 2
Prior to Smith, this result was justified on due process grounds. In Collins
v. Auger,7 3 for example, the district court excluded the defendant's con-
fession to a court-appointed psychiatrist during a competency interview
that he committed the act with which he was charged. In affirming the
district court's reasoning, the Eighth Circuit concluded it was funda-
mentally unfair to use the defendant's admissions made during a psychi-
atric interview as part of the prosecution's case.
74
In Gibson v. Zahradnick,75 the Fourth Circuit reached the same result
on fifth amendment grounds. In Gibson, the defendant exhibited bizarre
behavior immediately after he was incarcerated. After treatment for a
self-inflicted injury (defendant believed a microphone had been im-
planted in his ear and tore the ear off in an attempt to get the
microphone out), defense counsel requested an order that the defend-
ant be examined by a private physician. Before the examination, the
defendant was transferred to a state hospital where he conferred with a
psychiatrist. At trial, the state offered testimony of one of the state hos-
pital psychiatrists that defendant had told him he remembered going to
70. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see Byers, 740 F.2d at 1113
(plurality opinion).
71. In many cases where the insanity defense is pleaded, the defendant admits the acts
and is therefore guilty if he is sane. See Limiting the Insanity Defense, Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) [hereinafter Limiting the Insanity Defense]. In those cases, the admissions are used to
support a diagnosis of sanity and in that respect become self-incriminating. Byers, 740 F.2d
at 1108.
72. See cases cited in United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d at 1149 n.60 (Bazelon, J., dis-
senting), and Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1978).
73. 428 F. Supp. 1079, 1082-83 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
74. 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978). The actual holding of the Eighth Circuit was based
on a determination that the defendant showed sufficient "cause and prejudice" to be re-
lieved of a procedural default and would be allowed to raise the self-incrimination point.
See Wainiwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
75. 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996 (1978).
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his father-in-law's house and shooting him. 7 6 This testimony corrobo-
rated testimony of another witness that the defendant was the assailant.
In holding the testimony inadmissible, the court stated when the exami-
nation is one to determine sanity authorized under the court's inherent
power, the fifth amendment privilege bars the use of an incriminating
statement made to a psychiatrist for the purpose of proving a defend-
ant's guilt. 7 7 The court stated the same rule would apply in Gibson, a
habeas corpus case, by force of the fourteenth amendment, even though
the "inherent" power to order the examination might not be involved.
The rule applies, according to the court, whether the examination pro-
ducing the testimony is requested by the defense or by the prosecution,
and whether for the purpose of determining competency or sanity.
78
Conflict arises, however, where the defendant's admissions enter
the record as testimony to establish or rebut sanity and are carried over
by the factfinder to determine the issue of guilt. In any crime in which
specific intent is an element, the defendant should have the opportunity
to present evidence of lack of mental capacity to form intent. Likewise,
the state has the burden of proving specific intent as an element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 79 Evidence probative of incapacity to
form intent is frequently relevant to the issue of insanity, an issue upon
which the defendant bears the burden of proof in many jurisdictions. 80
Because the insanity defense is inseparable from the concept of culpable
mental state, it has been argued that the fifth amendment privilege
should apply equally to the issues of mental state and sanity. 8i
In Devine v. Solem, 82 the defendant, charged with burglary, entered
pleas of guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Though the state
trial court held that psychiatrists would not be permitted to testify to
admissions made "out of the blue" 8 3 concerning the offense charged,
one doctor testified the defendant stated he "intentionally got into
trouble" and went to the allegedly burglarized apartment and damaged
it. 8 4 Additionally, the court admitted statements that the defendant said
he made up symptoms of mental illness in order to be transferred to a
medical facility, wanted to be evaluated "to come up with a better solu-
tion," and had committed a crime.85 All three admissions were relevant
to the issue of sanity, but the court of appeals held the admission that
the defendant went to the apartment must be excluded because it was
76. 581 F.2d at 77.
77. Id. at 78. The court relied on United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1968), for this analysis.
78. 581 F.2d at 78-79.
79. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
80. Under 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986), insanity is now an affirmative defense in
the federal courts. The burden of proof-by clear and convincing evidence-is on the
defendant.
81. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
82. 815 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1987).
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relevant to the issue of guilt and therefore violated the privilege against
self-incrimination.
8 6 ,
In Smith, the Court said "the availability of the Fifth Amendment
privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protec-
tion is involved, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and
the exposure which it invites." 8 7 If an aim of the privilege is preserva-
tion of the integrity of the judicial system in which the prosecution is
required to "shoulder the entire load," 88 then requiring the state to
prove its case, without relying on the admissions of the defendant made
in the compelled interview, would reinforce the policies of the privilege
and discourage oppressive prosecutorial tactics. Some courts that have
used the waiver theory to allow use of admissions made by the defend-
ant have been overbroad in their analysis. 89 The rationale for the waiver
is that it would be unfair to allow the defendant to refuse to be examined
by the government psychiatrist and then allow the defendant to intro-
duce his own expert testimony on the issue of sanity. While this may be
generally correct, a more equitable state/individual balance could be ob-
tained by requiring the defendant to undergo the examination but to
narrowly circumscribe use of the testimony at trial, particularly direct
admissions of the defendant.9 0 Because the best evidence both of sanity
and guilt comes from the lips of the defendant, a narrow judicial inter-
pretation of the "waiver" theory would seem to further the policies of
the fifth amendment most effectively.
B. Impeachment
The issue as to whether the defendant's statements made to the
court-appointed psychiatrist may be used for impeachment depends
upon two variables: (1) whether the defendant takes the stand, and
(2) whether the statements were "compelled." As a general rule, the
testifying defendant is subject to impeachment even when the impeach-
ing evidence would be inadmissable in the government's case in chief.9 '
This is so despite language in Miranda v. Arizona, 92 to the contrary:
The privilege against self incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner
.... Statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the de-
fendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial ....
These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of
the word and may not be used without the full warnings and
86. Id. at 1207.
87. 451 U.S. at 462 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967)).
88. Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
90. Some courts seem prepared to keep the waiver narrow when direct admissions are
involved, but the issue appears not to have come up directly. In Buchanan v. Kentucky,
107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987), for example, the Court found no prejudice because defendant
failed to make "any statements." Id. at 2918 (emphasis in original).
91. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
92. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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effective waiver required for any other statement.93
The fifth amendment protection offered with respect to the com-
pelled psychiatric examination is an extension of Miranda.9 4 In Smith,
the Court reasoned a compelled psychiatric examination produced the
same coercive pressures as custodial interrogation and there was no less
of a need in the compelled psychiatric examination for the accused to be
aware of his fifth amendment privilege and the consequences of forego-
ing it. 9 5 It would seem, therefore, that the above language from Miranda
would foreclose use of information gained from an unwarned psychiatric
interview for impeachment.
The Supreme Court has, however, in balancing the needs served by
the exclusionary rule against the needs of the judicial process, carved
exceptions allowing the use of otherwise excludable evidence for im-
peachment. In Harris v. New York, 96 for example, the Court simply iden-
tified the above broad prohibition in Miranda as dictum.9 7 In allowing
the use of unwarned statements made to police to be admitted on the
issue of the testifying defendant's credibility, the Court emphasized that
though the defendant has the right to testify, he has no right to commit
perjury.98 Relying on the earlier decision in Walder v. United States,9 9
which allowed the defendant to be impeached as to a collateral matter
included in direct examination, the Court in Harris extended the use of
prohibited evidence to impeach the defendant's direct testimony on
matters directly related to crimes for which he was being tried. 100 This
extension burdens the defendant's choice of whether to testify in his
own behalf. 1
In United States v. Havens, '0 2 the Court permitted illegally seized evi-
dence to be used in rebuttal to impeach the defendant's responses to
questions put forth on cross examination. As Justice Brennan noted in
dissent, this allows the prosecutor to "work in . . . evidence on cross-
examination [as it would] in its case in chief."
10 3
In light of these cases, it would not be surprising to find that courts
are finding broad waiver of the fifth amendment privilege when the in-
sanity defendant takes the stand, thus allowing wide latitude in the use
of psychiatric testimony. Evidence that is foreclosed from government
use in the case-in-chief because made in a compelled psychiatric inter-
view, without Miranda warnings, becomes admissible on the issue of
93. 384 U.S. 436,476-77 (1966) (quoted in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230-31
(1970)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 467, 469 (1981).
95. Id.
96. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
97. Id. at 224.
98. Id. at 225 (citing United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969)).
99. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
100. 401 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
103. Id. at 632 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
66 (1954)).
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credibility. In Booker v. Wainwright,'0 4 when the defendant testified to
his lapse of memory, the court found no constitutional bar to the intro-
duction, for impeachment purposes, of evidence of the defendant's state
of mind on the day of the crime and of the defendant's previous violent
attacks on persons gleaned from the psychiatric report. 10 5 The logic of
the court was as follows: since Harris says Miranda cannot be used to
shield a perjuring defendant, and since Smith followed from Miranda,
then Smith cannot shield the perjuring defendant. 10 6 Taking this syllo-
gistic reasoning and adding to it the holding in Battie v. Estele, 107 that
the "introduction of psychiatric testimony by the defense constitutes a
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege in the same manner as would
the defendant's election to testify at trial," one must conclude that
where the defendant chooses to use the insanity defense, he will be sub-
ject to impeachment from a previous psychiatric report despite the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 1
0 8
The reasoning in Booker should not go uncriticized. In New Jersey v.
Portash,10 9 the Supreme Court held that legislatively immunized grand
jury testimony could not be used to impeach the credibility of a testify-
ing defendant. It distinguished Harris on the ground that although Har-
ris' statements were unwarned, they were not involuntary or coerced." 10
There being no question that testimony given in response to a grant of
immunity is coerced in the sense that the witness' choice is to talk or face
contempt, the Court held that the system's truth-seeking purpose need
not be balanced and that use of the testimony was impermissible. I "I
When the impeaching testimony in a case comes from a competency in-
terview, the reasoning of Portash should preclude its use since the de-
fendant's choice in the competency context is to cooperate or face
contempt, the same choice given in Portash. 1 2 In cases where the com-
petency examination serves a dual purpose and the defendant was una-
ware at the time of the examination that he would later assert the
insanity defense, 1 1 3 the reasoning of Portash should similarly preclude
the evidence's use for impeachment.
In cases where the defendant has interposed the insanity defense
before the examination which produces the impeachment evidence, the
reasoning of Simmons 114 should preclude its use. The defendant, as ar-
104. 703 F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 1258-59.
106. Id. at 1259.
107. 655 F.2d 692, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. See also Hargrave v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1182, 1192 (11 h Cir. 1987) (implying a
very broad waiver of the privilege when insanity is pleaded).
109. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
110. Id. at 458.
Ill. Id. at 459; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (statements made after
hospitalized defendant repeatedly asked for a lawyer were involuntary; therefore, use for
impeachment was prohibited).
112. United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973).
113. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); see supra notes 42-45
and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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gued by Justice Brennan dissenting in Harris, has a constitutional guar-
antee that he "be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the government to introduce .by way of
rebuttal, evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for
its case in chief."' 1 5 The defendant has a due process right to present
evidence in his defense; to force him to waive his fifth amendment privi-
lege, even for the limited purposes of impeachment, impermissibly bur-
dens that right. Even though, as the Fifth Circuit stated in Bathe v.
Estelle,' 16 this burden is justified by the state's overwhelming need for
the evidence and by the need to prevent fraudulent mental defenses, the
burden would seem to be less justified in the impeachment context than
in rebuttal of the insanity defense.
A case which would arguably justify the use of the testimony in im-
peachment is Noggle v. Marshall.' 1 7 In Noggle, the defendant was unco-
operative. Prior to trial, Noggle was examined by defense psychiatrists
with a view towards entering an insanity defense. On advice of counsel,
the defendant refused to cooperate with an independent expert ap-
pointed by the court. Noggle did not take the stand. Two defense psy-
chiatrists testified in response to hypothetical questions that Noggle was
insane. On cross examination, the state was allowed to elicit specific
facts told by the defendant to the doctors, including an admission that
he had stabbed the victim.' 18 The court held the state had the right to
test the validity of the defense experts' opinions' 1 9 and found the de-
fendant was not prejudiced when the court refused to instruct the jury
that the testimony could not be used on the issue of guilt, but only on
the issue of sanity. 1 20 Thus, evidence directly from defendant's lips en-
tered the record through a psychiatrist and was used to incriminate the
defendant based on the governmental need to impeach the defendant's
experts, even though the defendant did not take the stand.' 2 ' While
this appears to be a blatant violation of the privilege, Noggle is at least a
case where knowing actions of the defendant prevented the state from
rebutting the insanity defense. His refusal to cooperate with the in-
dependent expert arguably justified the use of the evidence.
In Gholson v. Estelle,12 2 the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's
argument that testimony from a court-appointed psychiatrist introduced
115. 401 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 65 (1954)).
116. 655 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983).
118. 706 F.2dat 1411.
119. In part, this holding must be grounded on Ohio Rule of Evidence 705 which re-
quires an expert to disclose the underlying facts upon which an opinion is based. 706 F.2d
at 1416 n.9.
120. Id. at 1417.
121. A distinguishing factor in Noggle is that the evidence was not the product of a
court-appointed examination. The Noggle court, however, saw no difference in compulsion
between a court-ordered examination and the subpoena of a psychiatrist who has made an
evaluation for the defendant, since evidence of sanity can only be obtained from the de-
fendant. Id. at 1415 n.6.
122. 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982).
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to contradict testimony of the defendant's doctor was "impeachment"
evidence allowed by Hamris.123 The Harris exception, according to the
court, applies only when the defendant has chosen to testify in his own
behalf. In Gholson, the defendant was examined by Dr. Grigson to deter-
mine sanity. A second psychiatrist, Dr. Holbrook, employed by the
state, examined the defendant without the knowledge of either the court
or defense counsel. At the sentencing hearing, the state called Dr. Hol-
brook. The defendant offered his own psychiatrist who testified that the
defendant was not a sociopath and was not likely to commit further vio-
lence. The state called Dr. Grigson to rebut defendant's expert. Be-
cause defense counsel had been entirely unaware of Holbrook, and
because they had been informed that Grigson was to examine to deter-
mine the defendant's sanity, which issue they had withdrawn from the
case, the defendant was surprised and unable to effectively cross ex-
amine. It was in this context that the government's impeachment argu-
ment was overruled.
Although on different grounds, the government also lost the im-
peachment argument before the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Leo-
nard. 124 Unlike Gholson, however, which was a habeas corpus case, Leonard
arose under federal law. Prior to trial, Leonard had filed a notice of
intent to rely on the insanity defense and, like Gholson, subsequent to
the exam but before trial had withdrawn the plea. At trial, the prosecu-
tion cross-examined Leonard as to statements made by him to the pros-
ecution psychiatrist. The court held that such impeachment was
prohibited by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c).' 2 5
The court reasoned that central to its authority to order a sanity
examination is an understanding that statements obtained in such an
examination be confined to the sanity issue.126 It declined to adopt case
law holding that 18 U.S.C. section 4244, the former provision for com-
petency exams, does not bar admission of statements for the purposes
of impeachment.' 27 The court based its reasoning squarely on Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c), which provides that no expert testi-
mony based upon the defendant's statements and no other fruits of the
examination may be admitted on any issue except mental condition. Be-
cause a sanity examination authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 12.2(c) seeks to obtain information from the accused bearing
directly on the issue of guilt, and because the defendant's statements on
123. Id. at 741.
124. 609 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 1165.
No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination provided
for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the consent of the
defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and no other
fruits of the statement shall be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any
criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the
defendant has introduced testimony.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
126. 609 F.2d at 1165.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
847 (1977).
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the issue of mental capacity to commit the crime are also central to the
issue of intent, there is a greater likelihood the psychiatrist will solicit
statements that will infringe the defendant's fifth amendment rights.
128
The court found nothing in the legislative history of rule 12.2(c) that
indicated case law developed under the competency provision should be
adopted.
In United States v. Leonard,'2 9 the Fifth Circuit appeared to resolve
the impeachment problem for cases arising under federal law. Rule
12.2(c) prohibits the use of the psychiatrist's testimony on any issue but
sanity. The broad prohibition protects the government's need for ex-
pert evaluation and prevents the defendant from waiving his fifth
amendment privilege. In those cases where rule 12.2(c) does not apply,
however, the courts should view the psychiatric interview as a compelled
or coercive interview, even when the defendant has pleaded insanity.
This would protect the defendant's due process right to present evi-
dence in his defense, as well as his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. Only in cases such as Noggle v. Marshall,130 where the de-
fendant is uncooperative and prevents the state from obtaining neces-
sary evidence on the sanity issue should the evidence from the
psychiatric interview be used for impeachment.
III. PART THREE: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
A. Federal Statutory Solutions
Following the trial of John Hinckley for the attempted murder of
President Reagan,' 3 ' revisions were made to the federal statutes gov-
erning insanity and incompetency. 132 Many states modified the defense
to provide for a guilty but mentally ill verdict.1 33 Over twenty bills were
introduced in Congress to change the insanity plea.' 3 4 Of major con-
128. 609 F.2d at 1167.
129. 609 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir. 1983).
131. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd., 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
132. The revisions were part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Pub.
L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984). The short title of the insanity provisions is the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 401 (1984).
133. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.020(e), 12.47.030, 12.47.050 (1962 & Supp. 1986);
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 401(b) (1979&Supp. 1984);GA. CODEANN. § 17-7-131 (1981 &
Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-2 to 6-4, 115-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973 & Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-1-1 to 35-36-2-5 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304.060(5), 504.120, 504.130 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 22-1-2(22), 23A-26-3, 12, 14 (1979 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-
13-1, 77-35-11, 75-35-21, 77-35-21.5 (1982 & Supp. 1986). See Mickenberg, A Pleasant
Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully
Preserved the Role of the Insanity Defense, 55J. CIN. L. REV. 943-96 (1987).
134. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1982) (state-
ment of Rep. Don Edwards, Presiding Chairman) [hereinafter as Insanity Defense in Federal
Courts]. In his opening statement, at the Senate Insanity Hearings, Senator Arlen Specter,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, stated that the committee had been convened promptly so
that the public could "be aware that the law can respond to correct errors where such
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cern in these bills was the need to define insanity for the federal courts,
assign the burden of proof of insanity to the defendant, and limit the
testimony of psychiatrists.1
3 5
The new statute defines insanity for the federal courts. 13 6 Prior to
the passage of section 17, the federal courts of appeals had used varying
definitions of insanity.' 37 Under the present formula, all federal courts
would ask the trier of fact to determine: (1) whether at the time of the
offense the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect; (2) and
whether as a result of the disease or defect, the defendant was unable to
understand the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.'
3 8
This definition represents a narrowing of the defense in jurisdictions
which had used the American Law Institute Model Penal Code test with
the volitional prong in that it removes cases in which the defendant is
able to show that he was unable to control his actions-the so-called
irresistible impulse test. This test is thought to be the reason for public
criticism of the defense.' 3 9 As far as the jury is concerned, the change
may have little meaning;' 40 for the defendant pleading insanity, how-
ever, the change means that the defendant must be able to show sub-
stantial illness.
Additionally, the new statute reallocated the burden in insanity
cases, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prove insanity by
clear and convincing evidence.' 4 1 Formerly, once the defendant
presented evidence of insanity sufficient to overcome the presumption
of sanity, the government was required to prove the defendant was sane
errors are found in the criminal justice system. Limiting the Insanity Defense, supra note 73, at
I.
135. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note 136, at 95 (statement of Rep. Don Ed-
wards, Presiding Chairman).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
(a) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constitut-
ing the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
137. Most federal courts used the ALI Model Penal Code test under which "[a] person
is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." ALI
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted in United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C.Cir. 1972)).
The Third Circuit used the Currens test: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is
alleged to have violated." United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961)
(footnote omitted).
The approaches of the federal circuits are outlined in Brawner, 471 F.2d at 978-80.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986).
139. The Insanity Defense, ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
136, 138 (1983) [hereinafter ABA Proposals for Change].
140. Hinckley Juror Brown, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee, felt that if
Hinckley were found not guilty by reason of his insanity, he should still have to pay for his
crime. Limiting the Insanity Defense, supra note 73, at 161. It may be, therefore, that the
average juror does not understand that insanity is a complete defense.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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beyond a reasonable doubt.1 4 2 Many felt the burden upon the govern-
ment to prove sanity was unfair, particularly when evidence of sanity or
insanity is peculiarly available to the defendant.
143
An additional change, wrought by the Insanity Defense Reform Act
of 1984,t44 was in the scope of expert testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 704.145 The effect of the change was to eliminate the then
current practice of allowing the expert to opine whether the defendant
was "sane" or "insane" or lacked the capacity "to conform his behavior
to the requirements of the law" or "knew right from wrong." The spec-
tacle of allowing competing expert witnesses to testify to directly contra-
dictory legal conclusions was considered too confusing for the jury.
14 6
This, however, like the niceties of the definition of insanity, may be more
a problem for lawyers and judges than for jurors.
14 7
The effect of these three changes should allow the defendant
greater protection of the fifth amendment privilege. First, the new defi-
nition of insanity narrows the opportunities for presenting a successful
insanity defense. It more accurately separates the mens rea and insanity
issues, allowing the government to disprove the defendant's assertion of
insanity by showing absence of mental disease or defect-a more clinical
inquiry than, for example, disputing "personality disorders." 148 Ac-
cording to the American Bar Association, after the narrowing of the de-
fense, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be placed
on the government, because as a matter of public policy, the govern-
ment should assume the risk of error when defendants' rights have been
142. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378
(1897).
143. Statement of President-Elect Edwin L. Miller, Jr. of the Nat'l District Attorneys
Ass'n at 16-17 (quoted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 3410).
Said Rep. E. Clay Shaw, "I would hate to think that any of us here in Congress would have
to prove our sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note
136, at 17.
144. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 401, 98 Stat. 2057.
145. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II § 406, 98 Stat. 2067. The rule now provides:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are mat-
ters for the trier of fact alone.
146. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, reprinted in U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3182, 3412 (1984).
147. HinckleyJuror Brown said:
As far as the defense-psychiatrists, I do not see how anyone really could have
went [sic] too much on their testimony except for some of the things Hinckley
told them .... Well, my ultimate decision, as I stated, I always thought he was
guilty. I really gave in to what my decision really was, not the evidence itself
made my decision, because by the evidence he was guilty. Limiting the Insanity
Defense. supra note 73, at 165, 192.
148. According to Professor Stephen Morse, mental disorder rarely negates mens rea.
The "crazy" killer intends to kill his victim; he does so for fundamentally irrational rea-
sons. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note 136, at 223 (written statement ofJ. Ste-
phen Morse, J.D., Ph.D., Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law and Professor of Psychiatry and
the Behavorial Sciences, University of Southern California Law Center & School of
Medicine).
[Vol. 66:1
INCRIMINATION AND THE INSANITY PLEA
restricted. 149 Nonetheless, Congress assigned the burden of proof (and
the risk of error) to the defendant, thus adopting a more restrictive
policy.
Though the narrowing of the defense and the shift in the burden of
proof may indicate an intention to restrict the rights of the defendant,
there is no indication that Congress intended to interfere with the right
against self-incrimination. In fact, if the burden of proof is on the de-
fendant, the need of the government to have psychiatric evidence
through a compelled interview is reduced. Because the defendant must
prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, in some cases the gov-
ernment may not need to present evidence on the issue at all. In cases
where defendant comes close to meeting his burden, the government
would need only rebuttal evidence.
The change in the scope of the expert's testimony should also pro-
tect the defendant. The expert's ultimate opinion need not be sup-
ported by admissions from the defendant. Psychiatric testimony would
be limited to presenting and explaining diagnosis and to what the char-
acteristics of the disease or defect may have been.150 Psychiatrist Ernst
Prelinger, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, said this in-
cluded evidence in concrete terms of the facts of the defendant's life
history, circumstances of his early development, family life experiences,
and particular emotional issues or conflicts relating to the act with which
he is charged. 15 1
In cases where the defendant pleads insanity and assumes the bur-
den of proof, the government's need for the compelled testimony is less-
ened. Therefore, waiver of the fifth amendment should not be implied
by the mere pleading of the defense and any waiver formerly justified by
the government's need for the evidence 152 should be very narrow.
The new statute has not been extensively tested in the courts. At
least two courts have held that the revisions narrow the affirmative de-
fense of sanity, but do not prevent the defendant from introducing psy-
chiatric evidence to negate intent. 15 3 Because intent is an issue upon
which the government bears the burden of proof, the government's
need for the compelled psychiatric testimony will be as great as it was
before the revisions. The statutory scheme, however, fails to provide for
authority to compel the defendant to be examined for the purpose of
assisting the government in rebutting the defendant's psychiatric testi-
149. ABA Proposals for Change, supra note 140, at 139.
150. See supra, note 146.
151. Limiting the Insanity Defense, supra note 73, at 232. On the other hand, Judge Gerald
B. Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, also testifying before the Senate com-
mittee, stated the expert is of no value to the trier of fact in some courts unless he renders
an opinion on the ultimate issue. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
855 (1976); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); Pope v. United States, 372
F.2d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 1967); see supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
153. United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v.
Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1985); contra United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889
(3rd Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
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mony on the issue of intent. 15 4 At least one court has said in dictum
that the courts' "inherent power" would still allow such an
examination. '
5 5
Compelling a defendant to be examined for the purpose of assisting
the government in rebutting the defendant's evidence negating intent
would appear to violate the fifth amendment. However, if the privilege
can be abrogated in the interest of fairness, as is suggested in earlier
decisions, 15 6 fairness, it could be argued, would dictate that the com-
pelled admissions be allowed. Because the statute now clearly sets out
different examinations to determine competency and sanity, the prohibi-
tion in section 4241 on the use of the competency determination should
be adhered to strictly. Only after the defendant notices intent to rely on
the insanity defense under rule 12.2(c)15 7 should an examination on the
issue of sanity be ordered. However, the evidence from the sanity ex-




It would seem at the very least, a court should instruct that testi-
mony allowed because the defendant has introduced the issue of mental
condition may be considered only on that particular issue.159 The prob-
lem, however, is that instructions are only of benefit if the jury will fol-
low them and insuring this may be difficult. The Supreme Court, in
Harris v. New York, 160 allowed the use of unwarned statements for im-
peachment only, and the trial court instructed the jury that the state-
154. By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 4242 gives authority to order an examination after de-
fendant files notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12.2(b) requires similar notice "[i]f a defendant intends to introduce expert
testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the de-
fendant bearing upon the issue of guilt," but does not itself authorize a compelled
examination.
155. United States v. Nichols, 661 F. Supp. 507, 509 n.4 (W.D. Mich. 1987); contra
United States v. Leonard, 609 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. In Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 1967), the court said it
would be a "strange situation" if the government, bearing the burden of proof and com-
pelled to afford psychiatric service and evidence, were denied the opportunity to have its
own exam. Accord State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 9, 210 A.2d 763, 770 (1965).
157. United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847
(1977).
158. In United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1983), the court held that
admissions made in a compelled interview were admissible where the defendant raised a
diminished capacity defense. Said the court construing rule 12.2: "Because Congress in-
tended to permit the admission of statements related to insanity, there is little doubt that it
also intended to admit statements related to mental capacity in general." Id. at 390.
159. A cautionary instruction was given in United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114,
1118 n.4 (10th Cir. 1982), as follows:
Now the defendant is not on trial before you for any act or conduct not charged
in the indictment, specifically any evidence as to . . . other crimes was admitted
solely for the reason that one of the experts utilized those claimed facts as a por-
tion of the basis of his opinion as to the mental competency of the defendant at
the time of the offense alleged in the indictment .... You are not to consider
such evidence for any other purpose that [sic] in evaluating the expert testimony.
160. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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ments could only be used for credibility. The Court has also recognized,
however, that the assumption that an instruction will invariably over-
come the juror's practical inability to separate the evidence is somewhat
naive. 161
In Noggle v. Marshall,162 the court recognized the debatable effec-
tiveness of such instructions, stating that they were "at best a device for
balancing interests of the State and the defendant."' 63 Whether the ab-
sence of the instruction was prejudicial in Noggle was determined by the
strength of the government's case, and the court recommended that in
every case the need for the instruction be tested by a question of general
fairness of the trial as a whole. 164 In contrast, the court in United States v.
Leonard 165 recognized that the statutory provision 166 itself limits the use
of the testimony in all cases. According to the House Conference Com-
mittee, a limiting instruction would not satisfy the rule if a statement
were so prejudicial that a limiting instruction would not be effective.'
6 7
The problem with relying solely on instructions as a cure for viola-
tions of the fifth amendment is that the Noggle test requires a very sub-
jective assessment by the trial judge. He must, in determining whether
to give the instruction, consider the strength of the government's case,
the context of the defendant's statements and the expert's recitation of
them, as well as the jury's ability to overcome prejudicial effects. Even
after he has made this determination, however, there is no way of assur-
ing that the jury will follow the instruction.
C. Limiting the Testimony of the Psychiatrist
A more realistic solution than limiting instructions to the jury is lim-
iting the testimony of the psychiatrist. In the federal courts, the revision
of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 may already afford defendants greater
protection of their fifth amendment rights than earlier case law. 168 Fur-
ther limitation could be imposed in the interest of the defendant's
rights.
At the heart of an evidentiary solution to the fifth amendment prob-
lem is the judicial system's need to assure truthfulness. Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 regulates the basis of opinion testimony by experts.
Under the rule, if the facts and data relied on by the expert are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence. 169 The fact that the expert may rely
on inadmissable evidence does not, however, mean he may automati-
161. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964).
162. 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir. 1983).
163. Id. at 1417.
164. Accord Watters v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1984).
165. 609 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
167. 6. CONt. REP. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 10, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 713, 715 (1975).
168. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
169. FED. R. EvID. 703.
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cally become a vehicle for introducing such evidence into the record.170
The trial judge has discretion under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and
611 to disallow the evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs probative
value or if the jury would be likely to be confused. 17 1 Thus, even with-
out the revisions to Federal Rule of Evidence 704, the trial judge has the
discretion to prevent the expert from testifying to facts related by the
defendant.
The rules of evidence also provide, however, for assuring that the
expert's opinion is well grounded. Dissenting in United States v. Byers,
17 2
Judge Bazelon suggests the balance between the need for well grounded
opinion and the defendant's right can be struck by excluding any state-
ments made by the defendant to the psychiatrist which are not integral
to the process of diagnosis. In Byers, the defendant stated that his wife
suggested to him he could be under the influence of magic spells or
roots. The psychiatrist testified the statement had not been vital to his
diagnosis because he did not feel it was pertinent to the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the offense and because it was the thinking
of the wife, not the defendant. The statement's admission at trial, how-
ever, was considered "devastating" by the trial judge and the
prosecutor. '
73
In most cases, however, it may not be so easy to determine what
statements are essential to the diagnosis. The American Psychiatric As-
sociation's position on the proposed changes in the insanity defense was
one of agreement with the limitation of expert testimony.' 74 The Asso-
ciation noted that in many criminal trials both prosecution and defense
psychiatrists agree on the nature and extent of defendant's disorder.
The disagreement comes with the medical expert's "leap in logic" to
testimony on the ultimate legal issue of insanity. 175 The psychiatrist re-
gards it as his just obligation to "present medical information and opin-
ion about the defendant's mental state and motivation and to explain in
detail the reason for his medical-psychiatric conclusions." 176 A number
of courts have recognized that defendant's admissions, and even his
omissions, may be critical to psychiatric conclusions. 17 7 In those cases,
170. United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194, 1206 n.22 (5th Cir. 1977) (while expert
may testify based on hearsay, witness here sought to establish a fact of which she had
insufficient knowledge); see also 3 W. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 389
(1979).
171. Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which
requires the court to make limiting instructions when evidence is admissible for limited
purposes, indicate that rules 403 and 105 are in close relationship. That is, the court may
either limit the use of the testimony or exclude it entirely.
172. 740 F.2d 1104, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1146 n.42 (Bazelon,J., dissenting). The court gave no reason why the testi-
mony was admitted notwithstanding its recognition of the prejudicial impact.
174. See ABA Proposals For Change, supra note 139, at 146.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Scott v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1977). In Otiver, the psychiatrist
testified, "[flor instance, he remembers when the gun went off that he was sitting there
with the gun in his hand." Though clearly establishing a fact of the offense, the testimony
went directly to the issue of defendant's memory, a matter relevant to diagnosis.
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the battle would still rage unless a more explicit prohibition is implied.
In jurisdictions where the expert may testify as to the ultimate issue of
insanity, the defendant's admissions may be even more obviously the
basis for the opinion.
178
The State of Arizona has adopted an evidentiary privilege which
serves to protect the defendant even when he raises the insanity de-
fense. 179 The statute provides a broad privilege for any admission made
by the defendant which concerns the transaction from which the current
charges stem. Introduction of admissions requires the consent of the
defendant and is not waived by defendant's taking the stand 180 or failure
to object.' 8 ' Case law interpreting the provision holds that the doctor
examining for the purpose of determining competency may give his
opinion regarding sanity at the time of the offense 18 2 and may testify
generally as to the basis of his opinion. 183 Evidence other than admis-
sions covered by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b)(l) may be
admitted when a defendant raises the insanity issue and takes the wit-
ness stand. Thus, highly prejudicial admissions are absolutely privi-
leged while the expert is free to explain his opinion using any evidence
gleaned from the examination except admissions about the crime
itself. 184
D. Bifurcation
Even in jurisdictions having evidentiary protection such as Ari-
zona's, bifurcation of the trial where insanity is an issue may be neces-
sary to fully protect the defendant. In such a procedure, separate
hearings are used to determine "guilt" or factual responsibility and cul-
pability under the jurisdiction's definition of insanity. In cases where
the defendant pleads not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, the
178. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; see also Isley v. Wainwright, 792 F.2d
1516, 1520 (11 th Cir. 1986), on remand, Isley v. Wainwright, No. 81-996-Civ.-T-15 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 17, 1987) (evidentiary hearing centered on issue of statements necessary for
expert opinion).
179. The Arizona Rule provides:
Rule 11.7. Privilege
A. GENERAL RESTRICTION. No evidence of any kind obtained under these
provisions shall be admissible at any proceeding to determine guilt or innocence
unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of
sanity.
B. PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANT
(1) No statement of the defendant obtained under these provisions, or evi-
dence resulting therefrom, concerning the events which form the basis of the
charges against him shall be admissible at the trial of guilt or innocence, or at any
subsequent proceeding to determine guilt or innocence, without his consent.
(2) No statement of the defendant or evidence resulting therefrom ob-
tained under these provisions, concerning any other events or transactions, shall
be admissible at any proceeding to determine his guilt or innocence of criminal
charges based on such events or transactions.
ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 11.7 (West 1987).
180. Berry, supra note 15, at 947.
181. State v. Magby, 113 Ariz. 345, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976).
182. Id. at 349, 554 P.2d at 1278.
183. State v. Torres, 127 Ariz. 309, 620 P.2d 224 (1980).
184. Berry, supra note 15, at 947-48.
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procedure prevents carryover of the defendant's statements from the in-
sanity issue to other issues such as intent, and prevents prejudice to
other defenses. '
8 5
Few jurisdictions mandate bifurcated trials when the insanity de-
fense is pled, 186 and a number ofjurisdictions have repealed or declared
unconstitutional bifurcation statutes.18 7 In general, the bifurcation pro-
cedure requires careful planning to avoid either duplication of evidence
by presenting psychiatric evidence on the issue of mental capacity for
intent in the first phase and on the issue of insanity in the second phase,
or violation of defendant's right to due process by precluding evidence
of lack of intent in the first phase and then providing no opportunity to
address that issue as the second issue is insanity.' 88
Even in the absence of statute, case law recognizes power in the trial
judge to use his discretion in providing for bifurcation and in ordering
the progress of the trial to avoid prejudice to the defendant.1 8 9 This
power is implicit in the common law power to order the trial' 9 0 and in
the federal' 9 1 as well as state rules of criminal procedure.' 9 2 The pres-
ence of a substantial defense on the merits which might be prejudiced by
the introduction of evidence on the insanity issue, and the presence of a
substantial insanity defense, should prompt the practitioner to request
these special procedures.
9 3
185. Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
186. See, e.g., 6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-104
(1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40 (1964 & Supp. 1987-88); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 12-109 (Supp. 1988); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(6); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 49
(West Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, § 7404 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.175 (West 1982).
187. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1621.01, 187, repealed by Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 35,
[effective October 2, 1978]; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 918.017, repealed by Laws June 6, 1979, ch.
79-164 § 186; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 46.02, repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1172 (Vernon 1965); Wvo. STAT. § 7-242.5(a) (1957), declared unconstitutional by
Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977).
188. Cf. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009
(1971); State ex rel Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978); Hermann, Assault on the
Insanity Defense: Limitations on the Effectiveness and Effect of the Defense of Insanity, 14 RUTGERS L.
J. 241, 291-310 (1983).
189. Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
190. Id. at 283.
191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b).
192. 10 U.L.A. 268, Rule 521 (1987) (provides an order of proceeding at trial "unless
the court for cause otherwise permits"). Similar statutes are CAL. PENAL CODE § 1094
(West 1985) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-402 (1987); Cf. TEX. CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 36.02
(Vernon 1981).
193. Among other procedures suggested have been recordation of the compelled in-
terview, United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting); presence of counsel at the interview, which was found not necessary in Thorn-
ton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 705-11 (1969) (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), and administration of a "psychiatric Miranda." See Read, Can a "Psychiatric
Miranda" Work? A California Perspective, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 431 (1983). The objection to each
of these methods has been that they are too obtrusive and interfere with the psychiatrist's
ability to examine the subject.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If we do recognize that the privilege against self-incrimination has a
place in our criminal justice system, 194 then the privilege should not be
easily waived by defendants pleading insanity. Because their mental
condition is often questionable, they should be assured greater protec-
tion of their right against self-incrimination.
Prior to the passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, the ten-
dency in the federal courts was to protect the government's interest in a
truthful proceeding by broadening the waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege when insanity was raised as a defense. Because statutory revi-
sions restrict the defense, they should be interpreted in such a manner
as to assure maximum self-incrimination protection. This could be ac-
complished by limiting the testimony of the psychiatrists to the facts ab-
solutely necessary in explaining their medical opinions, and preventing
them from directly revealing admissions of the defendant relevant to the
crime charged. Direct admissions gleaned from the psychiatric inter-
view, because it is a compelled or coercive interview, should be unavaila-
ble for impeachment, even when the defendant takes the stand.
Evidence gleaned from a compelled interview should be strictly confined
to the issue of sanity by the use of bifurcated trials whenever it appears
that the defendant will have a substantial defense on the merits, a sub-
stantial defense of insanity, and when it appears that limiting instruc-
tions will not cure the prejudicial effect.
194. See Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self Incrimination?, 33
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1986).
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